

27 September 1967

BRIEFING NOTICE

1. The Armed Services Committee of the House (Chairman Rivers) has established a special subcommittee under Rep. Porter Hardy (hereinafter Hardy Subcom) "to conduct a full and thorough inquiry into...the status of plans, including contingency plans, for achieving a military victory in Southeast Asia, the ability of our armed forces to simultaneously meet present commitments in SEA, as well as treaty obligations, including the availability of military equipment and present and projected force levels.In addition, the subcommittee will inform itself with respect to projected time estimates for achieving a military victory in SEA...and the number of military personnel required to achieve either a military victory or the cessation of hostilities, and the establishment of a viable government in South Vietnam.

2. DCI has been asked to testify at 0930 Monday, 9 October, on the existing and potential threats in Southeast Asia which might involve U.S. commitments, treaties, or security interests. The attached outline shows the ground DCI proposes to cover in his briefing. His terms of reference will of course be foreign--not U.S.--capabilities, intentions, objectives, etc., establishing a background for the Hardy subcom inquiry, which will be addressed primarily to DOD and State.

3. Proposed briefing time is two hours, or about 120 pages of our standard briefing format. To process a package of this size, and allow any time for coordination and review of the draft before the book goes to DCI, the bulk of the contributions must reach Presentation Staff at opening of business Friday Sept. 29. Up to a quarter of the book can come in as late as Sunday evening (about 7 p.m.), but Production Assistant should notify me Friday morning so that everybody doesn't decide his piece is in the late 25%. The complete book will be available for review in printed form, multiple copies, at opening of business Wednesday 10/4, necessary revisions will be made overnight, and the package will go to DCI in the course of the forenoon Thursday, 5 October, for his review, revision, and assimilation.

4. Classification is limited to TOP SECRET, but as in case of NIE's make use of Code Word and other sensitive information as long as you don't use details and facts which obviously could only have come from such sensitive sources and methods.

5. For each country where such information is pertinent, work in extent of U.S. troop presence, U.S. treaty and other commitments. Outside Vietnam, thrust of Hardy subcom's interest is obviously degree of threats to that country which might involve U.S.

6. This briefing is not a primer, but sitrep and prospects at a relatively high level of sophistication: All but two of the subcommittee members are also members of the Special CIA Subcommittee; Chairman Rivers and the ranking minority member, Congressman Bates, will be sitting in as ex officio members; and it should be fairly obvious that the subcommittee will be looking for information and judgments which will form a foundation for questioning subsequent witnesses--i.e., this has all the earmarks of a delicate situation.

25X1A

7610
Red 9380
Grey 8358
Tube BZ-4

SECRET

Outline, Hardy Subcom Briefing 9 October

(Suggested time references are in minutes; one page of our standard NSC format, with hanging indents and good margins, is about one minute delivery time.)

- I. Introduction and Terms of Reference (3:00)
(S/Pres drafting,
- II. Communist China is logical starting point as major hostile power in FE, with nuke capability, large conventional forces, massive manpower, and record of unwavering hostility toward U.S. and Free World.
- A. Limitations are obsolescence of conventional military forces, and domestic turmoil.
- Nature and capabilities of conv. mil forces. (4:00)
- Chaos of Cult. Rev makes demands on Army, ~~ARM~~ (6:00)
hampers transp/communications, disrupts industry and agriculture. Raises some question of loyalty of mil to Mao/Lin. (follow lines of recent Mahon briefing---chaos, moderation, warlordism? Whoever wins, no less hostile to U.S.)
- B. Advanced weapons. ChiComs nuke power on (10-15:00)
own by giving it overriding priority since end of Sov Aid in 1960.
1. Brief review of tests, present level of nuclear capability.
 2. Delivery systems. MRBM--radius of effectiveness. ICBM estimate. Air delivery. G-class sub, missile boats.
 3. Aircraft: MIG-19, possibility of MIG-21 and BADGER production.
 4. Other advanced hardware: SAM and AAM status.
- C. ChiCom Policy: What determines Peking policy--(10-12:00)
xenophobia, Middle Kingdom tradition, resentment of US FE presence, search for rice bowl, opposition to co-existence, irrationality aspects?
1. Status and evaluation of Sino-Soviet dispute.
 2. Interaction of Sino-Soviet dispute and Vietnam War.
 3. Relative Chinese and Soviet support of Vietnam.
 4. Effect of Vietnam war and Sino-Soviet rivalry (3:00)
there on Soviet-U.S. relations. (S/Pres will provide from Huizenga paper previously used by DCI in briefing.)
 5. ChiCom presence in DRV. Relations with, influence over DRV. (3:00)
 6. Circumstances we believe would bring various (4:00)
higher levels of ChiCom intervention. Include border air defense sensitivity, and ~~an~~ brief analysis of Chinese state of civil defense preparations. US--e.g., state of civil defense preparations.

SECRET

Degree of
ChiCom military
build-up in So. China.

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00827A001000060008-3

Hardy Subcom outline -2-

- E. Other Chicom relations: (in each case, use ChiCom policy/objectives, level of ChiCom threat as point of departure, then give situation within country, problems, what they seek from US, stability, insurgency, policy on Vietnam, etc., as pertinent.)
1. Laos--and how the war is going. Souvanna (6-7:00)
Phouma concerns re Ho Chi Minh trail, barrier suggestions, etc. DRV mil presence. Prospects, military, international/political.
 2. Thailand--policy re SEATO and own national security, mil cooperation re Vietnam, counter-insurgency picture. (5:00)
 3. Cambodia--Shnouk's objectives, tactics, policy. Mention of Free Khmer/Thai/SVN problems on border, own internal problems with leftists. His probable attitude of NVN/VC use of territory. Actual extent of NVN/VC use of Cambodian terr. (Remember, TS covers RDF and airborne recce so this can be factual.) (5:00)
 4. If ChiComs decided on general SEA offensive, what are their military capabilities for advance into Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma? What advance warning might we get? (We had this in briefing earlier this year; will try to attach copy.) (4:00)
 5. Indonesia Relations with China, as peg for analysis of domestic situation, economy, debt, outlook for international aid requirements. (4-5:00)
 6. British and Hong Kong (include mention of sensitivity on U.S. R&R use.) (3:00)
 7. Burma--and complicated insurgency problem. (3:00)
 8. India (3:00) (strictly in relation to ChiComs)
 9. Pakistan (Paks/ChiComs/US and SEATO) (5:00)
 10. Japan - (3:00)
 11. Taiwan Straits situation, ChiNat intentions/capabilities/problems, expectations of U.S. support (5:00)
 12. Sum up with analysis of possible effectiveness throughout area of MRBM nuclear blackmail. (2:00)

III. Other Asian Communists

- A. Briefly, North/South Korea. Where do North Koreans stand on Vietnam, in Sino-Soviet dispute? What are they up to in DMZ and with infiltrations? (5:00)
- B. North Vietnam. 15-20 minutes. What we know of their attitude toward negotiations. Mil. Posture. ~~What~~ What is nature of DRV economy? (don't express this directly in terms of Rolling Thunder.) What is DRV capability to continue war? Political military situation in South Vietnam and at DMZ.

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00827A001000060008-3

SECRET

Hardy Subcom outline

-3-

Avoiding any figures which are still in controversy, what's enemy OB, KIA rate, infiltration/VC recruitment rate, logistical requirements from outcountry to keep fighting going at present rate. What is current strategy--Giap article if useful, death of Nguyen Chi Thanh, extent of ~~DRV~~ ~~direct~~ ~~command~~ ~~over~~ ~~NFLSV~~ ~~VC~~ ~~fronts~~ in SVN, PAVN direct command over NFLSV/VC/fronts in SVN, increase in attacks on pacification teams.

South Vietnam--present role and effectiveness of ARVN, progress of pacification, outlook for political stability.

i.e., this is logically headed North Vietnam where it stands in outline, but it ~~should~~ should be a deadpan factual summation of the entire Vietnam situation North and South.

If there are any questions on content, approach, etc., contributors please call [REDACTED]

#

25X1A

SECRET

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00827A001000060008-3

Commitment

Involvement

Threat

Apr 30/1 ^{May}
2

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP79T00827A001000060008-3